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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a blind signature scheme and three practical educed schemes based on elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem. The proposed schemes impart the GOST signature structure and utilize the inherent
advantage of elliptic curve cryptosystems in terms of smaller key size and lower computational overhead to its
counterpart public key cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal. The proposed schemes are proved to be secure and
have less time complexity in comparison with the existing schemes.
Index Terms
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I. INTRODUCTION
Blind signature is a form of digital signature in which the message is blinded before it is signed, in order to allow
the requester to get a signature without giving the signer any information about the actual message or the resulting
signature. Blind signatures are used to build practical offline and online untraceable electronic cash schemes [1]–[4]
and widely employed in privacy-related cryptographic protocols, such as electronic election systems [5]. The paper
analogy to the blind signature is enclosing a ballot in a carbon paper lined envelope; In this way, the signer does
not view the message content, and also everyone can later check the validity of the signature.
Several blind signature schemes are proposed in the literature. The first scheme, proposed by Chaum [6], was
based on RSA signature. In [7], Okamoto proposed the blind Schnorr signature and Pointcheval et al. proved its
security in [8]. In 1995, Camenisch et al. proposed a blind signature scheme based on the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) [9] and later, in 2005, Wu et al. proved its untraceability [10]. Pointcheval developed a blinding
scheme for Okamoto’s signature in [11]. In [12], Huang et al. presented a blind signature scheme based on GOST
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2signature, which is the Russia’s digital signature algorithm [13]. In [14], an efficient blind signature scheme is
presented based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
In this paper, we propose a GOST-like blind signature scheme and three efficient educed schemes based on elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem. The schemes utilize the inherent advantage of elliptic curve cryptosystems in terms
of smaller key size and lower computational overhead compared to its counterpart public key cryptosystems such
as RSA and ElGamal. The schemes are proved to be correct and secure. They can be used in various cryptographic
protocols where the anonymity of the requester is required.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, basic concepts of elliptic curves are presented.
The GOST digital signature scheme is described in Section 3. In Section 4, the generalized scheme and three other
educed schemes are elaborated and the security and performances are discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes the
paper.
II. ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER FINITE FIELDS
The elliptic curve analogues of DLP-based schemes was independently proposed by Koblitz [15] and Miller [16],
in 1985. Since then, several cryptosystems are developed based on elliptic curve computations.
A non-super singular elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq is as follows:
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod q (1)
where 4a3 + 27b mod q 6= 0. The point P = (x, y), where (x, y) ∈ Fq × Fq satisfy Equation 1, together with a
point at infinity, denoted by O, form an abelian group (E,+,O) whose identity element is O.
The negative of P = (xp, yp) is −P = (xp,−yp). Let P = (xp, yp) and Q = (xq, yq) be two distinct points on
an elliptic curve such that P 6= −Q. Then P + Q = (xr, yr), where:
xr = (s
2 − xp − xq) mod q
yr = (−yp + s(xp − xr)) mod q (2)
where s = yp−yqxp−xq mod q.
Doubling a point P, in case of yp 6= 0, results in 2P = (xr, yr), where:
xr = (s
2 − 2xp) mod q
yr = (−yp + s(xp − xr)) mod q (3)
where s =
3x2p+a
2yp
mod q.
Definition: Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq and let P ∈ E(Fq) be a point of order n. Given another
point Q ∈ E(Fq), the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) is to find the integer d ∈ [0, n − 1],
such that Q = dP [17].
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3III. THE GOST SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, we describe the GOST digital signature scheme [13].
Let p and q be large primes that satisfy q|p− 1, and g be an element in Z∗p with order q. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
be a secure hash function. The signer’s secret and public key pair is (x, y), where x ∈ Zq and y = gx mod p. Let
m be the message to be signed.
Signing: The signer chooses random number k ∈ Zq and computes:
r = (gk mod p) mod q
s = xr + kH(m) mod q (4)
The signature on message m is (r, s).
Verification: The verifier computes:
v = H(m)q−2 mod q
z1 = sv mod q
z2 = (q − r)v mod q
u = (gz1yz2 mod p) mod q (5)
and checks whether u = r.
IV. THE PROPOSED GOST-LIKE BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
In [12], a blind signature scheme based on the GOST signature is presented. Here, we propose a GOST-like
blind signature scheme based on ECDLP.
There are two participants in a blind signature scheme: a signer and a group of requesters. Initially, the signer
publishes the necessary information. Then, the user sends a blinded version of the message to the signer. The signer
signs the blinded message, and sends the result back to the user. Afterwards, the user extracts the signature. At the
end, the validity of the signature is verified. The details of these phases are described below.
Initialization: First, the curve parameters must be agreed upon by signer and requester. Let E be the used elliptic
curve over Fq and suppose that the number of Fq-rational points on E is divisible by a sufficiently large prime
n > 2160. Let G be a point on E of order n. Signer must have a key pair suitable for elliptic curve cryptography,
consisting of a private key d (a randomly selected number in the interval [1, n − 1]) and a public key Q where
Q = dG.
Then the signer chooses random number k in the interval [1, n− 1], computes R = kG = (xr, yr) and sends R
to the requester.
Requesting: The requester chooses random numbers t1, t2 and t3 in the interval [1, n− 1] and computes:
X = (t1R + t2G + t3Q) = (t1k + t2 + t3d)G (6)
m′ = xrt1(m−1 + t3)−1 (7)
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Fig. 1. The proposed blind signature scheme.
then sends m′ to the signer. m′ is an encrypted version of the message, i.e. the blinded message.
Signing: Signer computes the signature of the blinded message as:
s′ = dxr + km′ (8)
and sends the result back to the requester.
Extraction: Requester extracts the signature of the message from the signature of the blinded message, by
computing:
s = m(t1s
′m′−1 + t2) (9)
and declares the pair (X, s) as the signature on m.
Verification: The legitimacy of the signature (X, s) for the message m is verified by examining:
sG = mX + Q. (10)
The various phases of the proposed scheme are summarized in Figure 1.
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sG = m(t1s′m′−1 + t2)G
= m(t1(dxr + km
′)x−1r t
−1
1 (m
−1 + t3) + t2)G
= m(t1k + t2 + t3d)G + dG
= mX + Q. (11)
A. Security of the Proposed Scheme
The security of blind signature schemes is defined by unforgeability and blindness. Here, we discuss these
properties of the proposed blind signature scheme.
Unforgeability: Forgery is an attack trying to fabricate a digital signature for a message without having access
to the respective signer’s private key. The security requirement of unforgeability of digital signatures is also called
non-repudiation.
To forge a valid blind signature, the adversary should obtain the signature s′ or the signer’s private key d to
fabricate the signature s′ = dxr + km′. It is impossible to obtain d from the public key Q using the equation
Q = dG, because it is based on ECDLP. To forge s′, a dishonest requester (as an adversary) must calculate
dxr + km
′. The requester knows the parameters Q and R and can compute xrQ +m′R, which is equal to s′G.
Again finding s′ from s′G is impossible, because it is based on ECDLP. Thus, the unforgeability of the scheme is
assured.
Blindness: A signature scheme is called blind, if the signer’s view and the resulting signature are statistically
independent. The signer’s view is the set of all values that the signer gets during the execution of the signature
issuing protocol, which in the proposed scheme is the tuple (R,m′, s′).
The three blinding functions are:
X = (t1R + t2G + t3Q)
m′ = xrt1(m−1 + t3)−1
s = m(t1s
′m′−1 + t2) (12)
It can be seen that, there always exists a tuple of random numbers (t1, t2, t3) which maps any (R,m′, s′) to any
(X, s), because there are three random parameters in the three blinding functions. Thus, the scheme is blind.
B. Educed Schemes
As in [12], three educed schemes are derived from the generalized scheme. In fact, two random parameters
are sufficient to provide blindness. The tuple of random parameters (t1, t2, t3) for the three educed schemes are
(1, t2, t3), (t1, 0, t3) and (t1, t2, 0). The security of the educed schemes is discussed below.
• Case I: t1 = 1
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6In this case,the blinding functions are:
X = (R + t2G + t3Q)
m′ = xr(m−1 + t3)−1
s = m(s′m′−1 + t2) (13)
The correctness and the unforgeability are the same as the generalized scheme and the blindness can be proved
as follows.
Let (xr,m′, s′) be the data appearing in the signer’s view during the execution of the signature and (X, s,m)
be the corresponding data at the verifier. It is sufficient to show that there exist a pair of random numbers
(t2, t3) that maps (xri ,m
′
i, s
′
i) to (Xj , sj ,mj), for i, j ∈ {0, 1}. We define:
t2 = mj
−1sj −m′i−1s′i
t3 = m
′
i
−1
xri −mj−1 (14)
By using Equations 6, 8, 10 and 14, we have:
Ri + t2G + t3Q = Ri + (mj−1sj −m′i−1s′i)G + (m′i−1xri −mj−1)Q
= Ri +mj−1sjG−m′i−1(s′i − dxri)G−mj−1Q
= Ri +mj−1(mjXj + Q)−m′i−1(kim′i)G−mj−1Q
= Ri + Xj − kiG
= Xj (15)
Thus, the tuples (xri ,m
′
i, s
′
i) and (Xj , sj ,mj) have exactly the same relation defined by the signature issuing
protocol, thus the scheme is blind.
• Case II: t2 = 0
In this case, the blinding functions are:
X = (t1R + t3Q)
m′ = xrt1(m−1 + t3)−1
s = t1ms
′m′−1 (16)
The correctness and the unforgeability are also the same as the generalized scheme and the blindness is proved
similar to the case I, by defining:
t1 = s
′
i
−1
m′isjm
−1
j
t3 = m
−1
j (xris
′
i
−1
sj − 1) (17)
• Case III: t3 = 0
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7TABLE I
DEFINITION OF NOTATIONS
Notation Definition
TMUL(p) Time complexity of a multiplication
TADD(p) Time complexity of an addition
TEXP(p) Time complexity of an exponentiation
Tinv(p) Time complexity of an inversion
TEC-MUL(p) Time complexity of an elliptic curve scalar multiplication
TEC-ADD(p) Time complexity of an elliptic curve points addition
In this case, the blinding functions are:
X = (t1R + t2G)
m′ = xrt1m
s = m(t1s
′m′−1 + t2) (18)
The correctness and the unforgeability are also the same as the generalized scheme and the blindness is proved
similar to the case I, by defining:
t1 = m
′
ixri
−1mj−1
t2 = m
−1
j (sj − xri−1s′i) (19)
C. Performance of the Proposed Schemes
The time complexity of the proposed schemes is compared with a recently proposed ECDLP-based blind signature
[14] and the scheme proposed by Camenisch et al. [9], which is declared to have superior performance than other
DLP-based blind signatures [10].
Table I defines the notations. In this table, the sub-index (p) denotes a prime field of order 2p. The time complexity
of various operation units in terms of the time complexity of a modular multiplication is illustrated in Table II [18].
Comparisons are based on the fact that an elliptic curve E(Fq) with a point P ∈ E(Fq) whose order is a 160-bit
prime offers approximately the same level of security as DSA with a 1024-bit modulus p [19].
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8TABLE II
UNIT CONVERSION OF VARIOUS OPERATIONS IN TERMS OF TMUL(1024)
Time Complexity of an Operation Unit Time Complexity in Terms of Multiplication
TEXP(1024) 240× TMUL(1024)
TADD(1024) Negligible
TINV(1024) 3× TMUL(1024)
TEC-MUL(160) 29.3× TMUL(1024)
TEC-ADD(160) 0.12× TMUL(1024)
TMUL(160) 0.024× TMUL(1024)
TADD(160) Negligible
TINV(160) 0.073× TMUL(1024)
TABLE III
TIME COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT SCHEMES IN UNIT OF TMUL(1024)
Scheme Rough Estimation of the Computation Cost
Camenisch [9] 1696× TMUL(1024)
ECDLP-based [14] 206× TMUL(1024)
The proposed scheme 206× TMUL(1024)
Educed scheme, Case I 176× TMUL(1024)
Educed scheme, Case II 176× TMUL(1024)
Educed scheme, Case III 176× TMUL(1024)
The detailed costs of the schemes are as follows:
TCamenisch [9] = 7TEXP (1024) + 2TINV (1024) + 10TMUL(1024) + 2TADD(1024)
TECDLP-Based [14] = 7TEC−MUL(160) + 3TEC−ADD(160) + TINV (160) + 6TMUL(160) + 3TADD(160)
TProposed = 7TEC−MUL(160) + 3TEC−ADD(160) + 3TINV (160) + 7TMUL(160) + 3TADD(160)
TEduced I = 6TEC−MU(160) + 3TEC−ADD(160) + 3TINV (160) + 5TMUL(160) + 3TADD(160)
TEduced II = 6TEC−MUL(160) + 2TEC−ADD(160) + 3TINV (160) + 7TMUL(160) + 2TADD(160)
TEduced III = 6TEC−MUL(160) + 2TEC−ADD(160) + TINV (160) + 7TMUL(160) + 2TADD(160) (20)
Table 3 provides a rough estimation of the overall time complexity of different schemes in terms of the required
execution time for a modular multiplication. While maintaining the security, the proposed scheme is more efficient
as compared to the scheme proposed by Camenisch et al. [9] and has the same complexity as the ECDLP-based
scheme proposed in [14]. Also, the educed schemes are about 15% more efficient than the generalized one.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper suggested a secure and efficient GOST-like blind signature scheme and three practical educed schemes
based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. The schemes utilize the inherent advantage of Elliptic
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9Curve Cryptosystems in terms of smaller key size and lower computational overhead compared to its counterpart
public key cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal. We proved the security of the proposed schemes is based on
ECDLP and the time complexity is lower than the existing blind signature schemes. The schemes are applicable in
the cryptographic services that emphasize the privacy of users, such as electronic voting over internet and untraceable
payment services.
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